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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of parents, and of the communities in which they live, to
educate their children according to their own beliefs is a fundamental one,
and educational pluralism is an essential aspect of respect that liberal
democratic states must show to their diverse citizenry. Accordingly,
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) states that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
have respect for the liberty of parents . . . to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”1
Nevertheless, while respect for parents’ and communities’ decisions with
regard to the form and content of their children’s education should be the
rule, there are instances in which the liberal democratic state is allowed and
indeed required to assert its authority in educational matters in order to
protect the rights and interests of others as well as the public’s interests.
The Israeli education system is a pluralist system that caters to the diverse
communities existing in Israeli society. This is especially true with respect
to the large Jewish religious communities, which—in addition to a public
religious education system—enjoy private education systems, the largest of
which is the ultra-Orthodox (UO) education system. The UO system, despite
being private, is heavily funded by the state. In recent years the Israeli
Supreme Court has heard two important cases involving the UO education
system, which have brought to the fore the conflict between religious
educational autonomy and the authority of the liberal democratic state.
These cases (the Core Curriculum cases) have highlighted the worrying fact
that the UO educational system for boys does not teach the core curriculum,
which includes, in addition to basic subjects such as math and English,
lessons in citizenship and core democratic values such as tolerance and
equality.2
UO schools for boys have for years restricted their curriculum strictly to
religious studies, because according to UO ideology the study of the Torah is

1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
HCL 4805/07 The Ctr. for Jewish Pluralism – The Movement for Progressive Judaism in
Isr. v. Ministry of Educ. et al. (unreported), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/
07/050/048/r28/07048050.r28.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2015 (unpublished)).
2
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every man’s highest obligation and is the equivalent of all other religious
commandments.3
A few days before the Court was scheduled to rule that the state may not
continue to fund UO private schools that do not teach the core curriculum,
the Israeli parliament passed a law that circumvented the Court’s expected
ruling—the Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act (the Act). 4 The Act
grants UO high schools (Yeshivot Ketanot) 60% of the funding awarded to
public schools, regardless of whether they teach any part of the core
curriculum.5 Although the Act applies only to high schools, the de facto
situation is that UO schools for boys have for years been teaching almost
exclusively religious studies at all levels of schooling while still receiving
extensive state funding.6 Thus, the model of autonomy for UO education
which the Act establishes, and which has existed de facto even prior to the
act, is one which combines generous state funding with an almost complete
lack of state supervision over the content of education.
In Part II of this Article I will describe the UO community, its educational
system, the Supreme Court core curriculum cases, and their end result—the
enactment of the Act. The proponents of the Act claimed that allowing this
form of autonomy in education to the UO is required normatively, from the
perspective of liberal multicultural theory, and is appropriate in a democratic
society. In Part III of this Article I will first examine the views of five liberal
thinkers with regard to the contours of the autonomy that should be granted
to religious education. These thinkers disagree on the extent to which the
state should allow the existence of private religious education, the extent to
which it should finance such education, and the extent to which it should
intervene in private religious education in order to ensure that these schools
maintain an adequate level of civic education. This disagreement roughly
matches the distinction between the autonomy-based conception of
liberalism and the diversity-based conception of liberalism.7
I will then perform a comparative legal analysis of the autonomy granted
to religious communities in the area of education in five countries. I will
discuss the education of Muslims in the Netherlands and Britain, private
3

See Ehud (Udi) Spiegel, Talmud Torah is Equivalent to All: The Ultra-Orthodox
(Haredi) Education System for Boys in Jerusalem, at vi (The Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, Series No. 405, 2011).
4 The Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act, 5769-2008, § 1 (Isr.).
5 Id.
6 See Spiegel, supra note 3, at xvi.
7 See generally William Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995).
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religious education in the United States, the Imam Hattip religious schools in
Turkey, and private Muslim education in Malaysia. The first three countries
I discuss—The United States, the Netherlands and Britain—are liberal
democracies, while the last two—Turkey and Malaysia—are not liberal
countries. In both Malaysia and Turkey the majority Muslim religion plays a
crucial role in shaping the national ethos and the relations between the state
and religion are much closer than they are in liberal democracies.8 Although
Israel is customarily considered a liberal democracy and is compared to
western liberal democracies, its state structure contains some significantly
illiberal elements, such as the establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion
in the state. Consequently, as I will show, important insights can be gained
from comparing Israel to countries in which the state is similarly closely
intertwined with religion.
I will claim that in liberal countries, as well as in the writings of liberal
theorists, it is possible to identify two models of autonomy in religious
education. One model—which can be found in countries such as Britain and
the Netherlands—combines a relatively high degree of supervision over the
content of education with the grant of state funding, and the second model—
which can be found in the United States—combines almost no state funding
with rather lax supervision. A third model can be observed in non-liberal
Malaysia and Turkey. Because religion and the state are closely intertwined
in this third, non-liberal model where the state uses religion as a source of
legitimacy and authority, the autonomy granted to private religious
educational institutions is highly restricted. The theoretical and legal
analysis will lead me to conclude that the form of educational autonomy
granted to the UO is neither required normatively nor comparable to the
autonomy granted to the educational systems of religious groups in the
countries discussed. Israel, which does not fit any of the above-mentioned
models, emerges as a unique hybrid that, on the one hand, gives extensive
religious autonomy in education to the UO community—on misguided
liberal grounds—while, on the other hand, allowing this same community to
retain control over the Israeli religious establishment and to enforce its
increasingly radical religious ideology through this establishment. Thus, in
Part IV of the Article I will conduct a detailed analysis of the position of the
UO community in the Israeli polity, considering, among other things, the

8

As we will see infra Part III.B.5, despite the fact that Turkey is an allegedly staunchly
secular state, the Muslim religion is in fact closely intertwined with the state and highly
important for the national ethos.
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unique structure of religion-state relations in Israel and the position of the
UO within this structure. I will claim that far from being a disempowered
enclave community or partial citizens, the UO community in Israel emerges
as what I will call a prodigious enclave community, which is politically
strong and highly influential.
I will claim further that, because of this status, the multicultural discourse
used to justify the Act and the accommodations that it offers is misplaced.
My conclusion in Part V will be that the right to an exclusively religious,
state-funded education that was granted to the UO community by the Act is
the result of a political power play—that cannot be justified theoretically or
comparatively and that constitutes a challenge to the rights of others as well
as to the already shaky liberal democratic foundations of Israel. I will
therefore offer some thoughts as to the measures that Israel could take in
order to thwart the threat to its democratic structure that the current situation
poses, and will claim that, among other things, the state should cut funding to
any school that does not teach the core curriculum.
II. UO EDUCATION IN ISRAEL—BACKGROUND
The UO educational system is the largest private educational system in
Israel and the one that gets the most generous state funding and the least
supervision. Before discussing the Israeli educational system and the recent
core curriculum cases, which demonstrate the problematic nature of the UO
educational system, it is important to give a short overview of the UO
community in Israel.
A. The UO Community
The UO Jewish community in Israel consists of around 800,000 people,
comprising about 10% of the Israeli population.9 The UO community,
known in Hebrew as the Haredi community, or the Haredim, gets its name
from the proverb in Isaiah 66:5 “Hear the word of the Lord, you who tremble

9 It is very hard to produce accurate estimates of the size of the ultra-orthodox community,
and the estimates vary according to the measuring methods used. See Fridman et al., THE
ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU FOR STATISTICS, Measurement and Estimates of the Population of
Ultra-orthodox Jews, 4–5, 51, 54 (2011) [Hebrew].
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(haredim) at His word.”10 The UO are a radical segment within Orthodox
Judaism, and while there are many subgroups within the UO community they
all distinguish themselves from other Jews by their dress, attitudes, world
view and the character of their religious lives.11 The three main subgroups in
the UO community are the Lithuanians, the Hasidim, and the Sephardi UO,
but these subgroups are themselves divided into many different subcommunities.12 According to Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, the
UO can be considered fundamentalists in that they believe in the
fundamental truths of their religion, which they assume, are unchanging from
the time of Abraham, and they look to the past as “the great teacher.”13
Furthermore, a crucial feature of their existence is “a refusal to endorse or
legitimate contemporary Western culture” and their entire lives are dedicated
to “fortifying their own way of traditional Judaism” in opposition to
modernity.14 Thus, while UO fundamentalism is built on a commitment to
an idealized past, this past has in fact never existed and is constructed and
reconstructed by UO sages in opposition to developments in modern culture
and society.15 The UO community has objected to the establishment of the
state of Israel and still retains an anti-Zionist ideology to this very day.16
Furthermore, the UO consider themselves, and are often perceived by others
as, a secluded enclave community. Nevertheless, UO representatives have
served in the Israeli Knesset and been involved in Israeli politics since the
establishment of the state and their political power, as well as their power in
Israel’s religious establishment, has grown considerably over the years.17
The UO community is the fastest growing religious community in Israel.
The average fertility rate of UO women stands at almost 7.7 children per
woman, as opposed to 2.6 children per woman for the Jewish population in
general.18 Only about 37% of UO men work while almost half of UO men

10

Samuel Heilman & Menachem Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism and Religious
Jews: The Case of the Haredim, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 197, 198 (Marty &
Appleby eds., 1994).
11 Id. at 197, 199.
12 See Spiegel, supra note 3, at xviii.
13 Heilman & Friedman, supra note 10, at 197.
14 Id. at 198.
15 Id. at 257.
16 MENACHEM FRIEDMAN, THE HAREDI (ULTRA-ORTHODOX) SOCIETY – SOURCES, TRENDS
AND PROCESSES 19–20 (1991).
17 Id. at 52–54, 188–91.
18 The data is from of 2001. Hagai Levin, The NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, The Haredi
Sector in Israel: Empowerment through Workforce Integration 10 (2009) [Hebrew].
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study religious studies in Yeshivot and Kolelim and receive stipends from
the government in return.19 More than 50% of the UO women work, but
most of them work only part time, due to their domestic duties.20 Because of
the combination of very high fertility rates with very low workforce
participation the UO community is the poorest community in Israel and its
mode of existence is heavily dependent on state funding and on donations.21
It should be noted that the UO community at the time of the establishment of
the state of Israel was quite different, with UO women’s fertility rates being
similar to those of other Jewish women and with UO men quitting their
religious studies and finding jobs upon marriage.22 Experts have related the
radical change in the structure of the community to the combination of
generous financial support by the state and the changing religious and social
norms within the community as it continued to grow and to gain a more
powerful position in Israeli society.23
The continuous study of Tora (Talmud Tora) has always been a central
ideal in Jewish tradition and is considered the equivalent of all other
religious commandments.24 While throughout history this ideal—which is
practically impracticable due to the need to earn a living—has been fully
realized only by a few select sages, in contemporary UO society in Israel the
full realization of this ideal has become the sole goal of the UO education
system.25 Consequently, the UO education system centers on teaching all
boys rigorous religious studies throughout their school years with almost no
secular subjects being taught.26 This paves the way for boys in the UO
community, after finishing Yeshivot Ketanot (the UO equivalent to high
school), to continue their full time religious studies in Yeshivot Gdolot (until

19

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14–16.
21 Id. at 41–43.
22 GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE UNMAKING OF ISRAEL 165–66 (2011).
23 Norma Gurovich & Eilat Cohen-Kastro, Ultra Orthodox Jews—Geographic Distribution
and Demographic Social and Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish
Population in Israel 1996–-2001 (Central Bureau of Statistics—Demography Sector 53–54,
Working Paper No. 5, 2004) [Hebrew], available at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/paperwork/
pw_e.html; Eli Berman, Subsidized Sacrifice, State Support of Religion In Israel, 12 (The
Pinhas Sapir Center for Development Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 2-99,
December 1998), available at http://sapir.tau.ac.il/papers/sapir-wp/2-99.pdf.
24 Spiegel, supra note 3, at vi.
25 Id. at xxiv.
26 Id.
20
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their marriage) and later in Kolelim.27 As already mentioned, currently
almost half of UO men devote all their time to religious studies in these
institutions and their only income is stipends they receive from the state.28
B. The Israeli Education System and UO Education
The Israeli educational system consists of three types of schools—public
schools, private schools that must go through a process of recognition by the
state (recognized schools), and private schools that have been exempted from
the recognition (exempt schools).29 According to Israeli law, in order to
achieve recognition a school must teach at least 75% of the core curriculum
as set by the Ministry of Education. A recognized school that teaches the
core curriculum is eligible for 75% of the state funding given to public
schools. 30 The two largest networks of UO schools are an exception to this
rule. These schools are recognized schools, comprise more than half of the
UO educational system, and receive 100% of the funding that public schools
receive, despite being private.31 The UO educational system is the largest
private school system in Israel, and it consists of both recognized and exempt
schools. One out of every four students in the Jewish educational system
attends an UO school. Although the law stipulates that only recognized
schools that teach the core curriculum can be funded by the state, both
recognized and exempt UO schools are funded by the state, even though the
UO schools for boys do not teach the core curriculum or teach only small
parts of it. In order to circumvent the enforcement of the core curriculum in
UO schools, over the years consecutive Ministers of Education have
abstained from officially defining the core curriculum, despite the fact that
the Public Education Act requires them to do so.32 Only after a petition
against the Ministry of Education was filed to the Supreme Court requesting
an order requiring the ministry to publish an official core curriculum and

27

Yaacov Lupu, Haredi Opposition to Haredi High-School Yeshivas, The Floersheimer
Institute for Policy Studies, 30 (2007).
28 Levin, supra note 18, at 13.
29 Mandatory Study Act, 5510-1949, SH No. 26, p. 287.
30 State Education (Recognized Institutions) Regulations, 5714-1953 (Isr).
31 The Budgetary Principles Law, 5745-1985, 37 LSI 61, § 3(A).
32 State Education Act, 5713-1953 7 LSI 113, §§ 11, 34(3); Lotem Peri Hazan, The
Regulation of Ultra Orthodox Education in Israel – Politics, Law and In Between, in
REGULATION OF EDUCATION (Yossi Yona ed., 2012), 5 [Hebrew].
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enforce it on all schools, was an official core curriculum established for
elementary schools.33
C. The Core Curriculum Cases
In 2002 a petition was filed with the Supreme Court, asking it to declare
illegal and discriminatory the Ministry of Education’s practice of funding
UO schools despite the fact that these schools do not teach any part of the
core curriculum and provide an exclusively religious education.34 In its
response to the petition, the Ministry of Education asked the court to grant it
a period of three years to incorporate the core curriculum in UO schools
gradually and with cultural sensitivity.35 The court accepted the respondent’s
request, ruling that requiring the implementation of the core curriculum in
UO schools, while granting the state three years to accomplish this goal in
cooperation with the UO community, struck the proper balance between
respect for the educational autonomy of the UO community, the rights of
children, and the interests of the state.36 The Court explained that the
purpose of the core curriculum is to enable students to acquire basic
knowledge, skills, and values that are essential to allow each student to
function independently in a pluralistic society, and it is based on shared
universal humanistic values and on the character of Israel as a Jewish and a
Democratic state.37 In addition, the core curriculum is intended to give every
child in Israel the basic skills to create a life for himself and to fulfill his
right to have an equal opportunity to develop his personality and his self,
both as a child and as an adult.38 The core curriculum includes the study of
Judaism, citizenship, geography, Hebrew, English, math, sciences, and
physical education.39
When, after three years, petitioners realized that the state and the UO
educational authorities had done nothing to implement the law and to
introduce the teaching of the core curriculum in UO boys’ schools, while at
33

HCL 2751/99 Paritski v. The Minister of Educ. [2000] (unreported) (Isr.).
HCJ 10296/02 Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education IsrSC
59(3) 224 [2005] (judgment of J. Levy § 1).
35 Id. §§ 2–5.
36 Id. § 19.
37 HCL 4805/07 The Ctr. for Jewish Pluralism – The Movement for Progressive Judaism in
Isr. v. Ministry of Educ. et al. (judgment of J. Procaccia § 31).
38 Id.
39 Id. In Arab schools the core curriculum includes Arabic in addition to Hebrew and Arab
heritage instead of Judaism.
34
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the same time the funding for these schools continued unabated, they
petitioned the court again requesting another court order against the Ministry.
This time the Ministry of Education notified the court that it had concluded
that at the present time it was unwise to enforce the introduction of the core
curriculum in UO high schools for boys, and asked the court to permit it to
continue its attempts to reach an agreement with the UO community as to the
implementation of the core curriculum.40 The ministry acknowledged that
having tens of thousands of students each year exempted from the teaching
of the core curriculum jeopardizes important state interests, but opined that
under the circumstances this was the right thing to do.41
The court categorically rejected the position of the Ministry of Education,
viewing the failure to implement the core curriculum in UO boys’ schools as
a serious violation of the rights of UO school children to education and to
equal opportunities, and as a threat to important state interests. While the
court acknowledged the importance of the autonomy of parents to decide on
the education of their children, it opined that the importance of a common
core curriculum is especially high in a country such as Israel where the
divisions in society are deep and widespread.42 Furthermore, the right of
parents to autonomy in choosing their children’s education cannot supersede
the right of the child to have a basic education that supplies him with the
skills which allow him to fulfill his personality and his capabilities.43 The
court agreed that deep cultural differences might justify a more gradual
enforcement of the core curriculum on certain cultural groups, but stressed
that the need for gradual implementation of equal enforcement cannot be
used to dispense with equal enforcement altogether as the ministry of
education was attempting to do in the case at hand.44
Nevertheless, though the court was set to give an order mandating the
enforcement of the core curriculum for the coming school year and
terminating the funding of all schools that refuse to implement it, the Court
did not do so.45 A few days before the judgment was due to be published,
and after it was already written, the Knesset passed the Unique Cultural

40

Id. §§ 15–16.
Id. § 17. The UO educational authorities objected to the suggestion to reduce their
funding to 55% and insisted that it be kept at 75% and that they be exempt from the duty to
teach the core curriculum.
42 Id. § 58.
43 Id. § 55.
44 Id. §§ 76–79.
45 Id. § 83.
41
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Educational Institutions Act (the Act), which exempts UO boys’ high schools
from the duty to teach the core curriculum, while continuing to grant them
state funding.46 Because the Act changed the legal situation pertinent to the
case while court proceedings were still in progress, the court refrained from
issuing any orders, but published the detailed written opinion it had already
prepared.
D. The Act
The Act was an initiative of the UO Knesset members aimed at
circumventing the coming decision of the court and was passed with the
support of secular Knesset members.47 The explanatory notes for the
proposed Act stated that the Act’s purpose is to enable the existence of the
educational institutions of the UO community and similar unique cultural
communities, in view of the need to respect the rights of such unique cultural
communities, and to enable them to maintain their own educational
institutions. 48 The Act defines a “unique cultural educational institution” as
an educational institution, which gives systemic education that originates
from the way of life of the unique cultural group and is in accordance with
the unique characteristics of the group.49 The only group to which the act
explicitly applies is the UO community.50 The Act grants UO high schools
(Yeshivot Ketanot) 60% of the funding awarded to public schools, regardless
of whether they teach the core curriculum, thus enabling them not to teach
their students any basic skills, such as math, English, or citizenship
education. Although the Act applies only to high schools, the de facto
situation is that UO schools for boys have taught almost exclusively religious
studies at all levels of schooling while still receiving extensive state funding
for years.51 Thus, the model of autonomy for UO education which the Act
46

The Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act 2008, § 1.
Tami Harel Ben Shachar, Educational Autonomy, The Core Curriculum, and Public
Funding of Education — The Special Cultural Educational Institutions Act, 2008, 12 MISHPAT
U’MIMSHAL 281; see infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
48 Proposed Act: Unique Cultural Education Institutions, 239 Proposed Acts 350 (June 23,
2008).
49 Id. The only group to which the Act explicitly applies is the UO community. The
Minister of Education has the authority to recognize other groups as unique cultural groups for
the purpose of the act, but thus far no other group has been recognized as such.
50 Id. the Minister of Education has the authority to recognize other groups as unique
cultural groups for the purposes of the act, but thus far no other group has been recognized as
such.
51 Spiegel, supra note 3.
47
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establishes, and which existed in practice prior to the act, is one which
combines generous state funding with an almost complete lack of state
supervision over the content of education.
To conclude, the UO educational system in Israel is a private, religious
one that is heavily funded by the state but at the same time subject to very
little state control. One could argue, as the supporters of the Act have, that
giving religious parents and communities a free hand to determine the
education of their children and helping them to fund this education is
required as a matter of multicultural justice and freedom of religion. In order
to evaluate this claim, in the next section I will review the positions of
different theorists on this issue and describe the way in which five different
countries deal with the educational systems of religious groups.
III. THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATIONAL
AUTONOMY FOR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
A. Theoretical Perspectives
Education plays a crucial role in shaping world views and the identities of
children and of young adults. As philosopher Elizabeth Minnich argues,
“education is of critical importance. It is in and through education that a
culture, and polity, not only tries to perpetuate but enacts the kinds of
thinking it welcomes, and discards and/or discredits the kinds it fears.”52 For
this reason educational autonomy is highly important for religious minorities.
Nevertheless, for the same reason, partial state control over private education
seems necessary to ensure that important interests of the liberal democratic
state are not jeopardized.
When assessing autonomy in religious education the rights and interests
of three actors should be taken into account.53 First, the interest of the
parents, whose right to decide the education of their child is part of their
religious freedom.54 Most often the parents belong to a religious community
and aspire to inculcate in the child that community’s religious values and

52

ELIZABETH MINNICH, TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE 53 (1990).
ROB REICH, BRIDGING LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
148–49 (2002).
54 Galston refers to this right as their right to expressive liberty. See, e.g., WILLIAM
GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL P LURALISM 45 (2005).
53
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way of life, an interest which they share with the community.55 The second
actor is the child, whose right to an enabling education and to equal
opportunities can be jeopardized by her parents’ educational choices for
her.56 Finally, the third actor is the state; as we will see, many theorists argue
that the continued existence of the state as a functioning democracy depends
on its citizens’ ability to participate in the life of a modern democratic state,
an ability that can only be acquired through education.
Liberal thinkers disagree on how the balance should be struck between
these different sets of interests, and consequently about the extent to which
the state should allow the existence of private religious education, whether it
should finance such education, and whether it should intervene in private
religious education in order to ensure that private religious schools maintain
an adequate level of civic education. This disagreement roughly matches the
distinction between the autonomy-based conception of liberalism and the
diversity-based conception of liberalism.57 In what follows I will describe
the positions of five theorists. I will start with Brian Barry, who holds an
autonomy-based conception of liberalism and who is perhaps the most avid
supporter of state control over education, and end with Chandran Kukathas,
whose strong diversity-based conception of liberalism leads him to eschew
any state control over private education. In between, I will discuss the more
nuanced approaches of Eamonn Callan, Jeff Spinner-Halev, and William
Galston. Another relevant distinction which is worth noting between these
theorists is between those who support government funding for private
schools if it is accompanied by close regulation by the state, and those who
object to government regulation of private religious schools but at the same
time also object to government funding for such schools. When discussing
country case studies we will see that a similar distinction emerges in the
practice of liberal states with respect to private religious schools.
Brian Barry is a strong believer in the right and duty of the state to have a
say in the way parents and communities educate their children, in order to
safeguard both the interests of the state and the rights and interests of the
child.58 As far as the interests of the state are concerned, Barry argues that
55

The right to instill their values and lifestyle to their children is also part of the parents’
right to culture.
56 As will be discussed below, different theorists have different perspectives as to what an
enabling education entails.
57 Galston, supra note 7, at 526–27.
58 BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY 209 (2001). According to Barry there is no
group right to the education of children, only the right of the parents. Nevertheless, the group
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all citizens have an interest in the future of their society and that the future of
society, “including its economic prosperity, its social stability and even its
continued existence as a distinctive entity, depends on the way in which
those who are now children turn out.”59 In terms of the interests of the
children, Barry argues that there are three aims that a proper education
should fulfill. The first aim of education, which Barry terms functional
education, is to equip the child with the competences required to function
successfully in the society into which she will grow up.60 The second aim of
education, which Barry calls education for living, is to equip the child with
knowledge that exceeds the functional knowledge needed to obtain a job and
which allows the child to better understand the world around her, to develop
an aesthetic appreciation and a critical capacity.61 The third aim of education
according to Barry should be to develop in the child a capacity for
autonomy.62 Barry supports a multicultural education insofar as it means that
the curriculum is inclusive and pays attention to the various groups that exist
in society.63 Nevertheless, he insists that all schools must have a common
curriculum. He is concerned that the proliferation of separatist schools
which admit only students of certain ethnicities and religions and refuse to
teach the common curriculum, will lead to the disintegration of society.
According to him “there is, quite simply, little chance for a society to operate
in a way that serves the long run interests of any of its members if it is
divided up into mutually exclusive groups who have not only gone to
different schools but have followed different curricula in them.”64 Barry’s
emphasis on a common curriculum and on tight state regulation of both
public and private schools can explain why he does not object to state
funding of private schools and sees it as a question of only minor
significance. While he is willing to allow state funding for suitable private
religious schools,65 he insists that private religious schools such as the
Christian fundamentalist schools in the United States, which teach only
creationism and whose biology textbook explains that evolutionary theory is

to which the parents belong has a crucial influence on the education that the children receive.
Id. at 207.
59 Id. at 209.
60 Id. at 212–20.
61 Id. at 221–24.
62 Id. at 224–25.
63 Id. at 238.
64 Id. at 237.
65 Id. at 204–05.

2014] THE UO COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 757
a creation of Satan that is used effectively against Christians, must be shut
down.66
Eamonn Callan maintains that states should fund private religious
education out of respect for parents’ right to educate their children according
to their beliefs. Nevertheless, he holds that states are entitled to give
preference to public common education in order to promote the important
state interest in civic education. According to Callan, in their educational
policies states should recognize religious groups with which individuals
identify in order “to give equal respect to individual human beings whose
very identity is constituted by different religious commitments.”67
Nevertheless, his approach gives prominence to the ends of civic education.
He posits that while religious education is important for the perpetuation of
the religious identities of citizens, civic education is essential for the shared
interest of all citizens in the continued existence of a liberal democratic state.
Consequently, if the partiality of the state to common, secular public schools,
serves the interests of civic education, then it is justified and should not be
considered arbitrary.68
Callan argues that the most important function of common schools is to
enable children to engage in inclusive deliberation.69 He posits that in a
pluralist society everybody has to be educated to give respect to others by
making what Bernard Williams calls “the effort at identification.”70 Thus, in
order to show respect to another, one must ensure that the other person
“should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be
applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his
point of view.”71 This is a duty that all of us owe each other, regardless of
66

Id. at 249.
Eamonn Callan, Discrimination and Religious Schooling, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE
SOCIETIES 45, 50 (Will Kymlick & Wayne Norman eds., 2000).
68 Id. at 54–55. Callan takes for granted that the state has an interest in maintaining its
liberal democratic character, but in Israel this is the bone of contention. If there is no
agreement that the state needs to continue to be a liberal democracy, then the need for civic
education can no longer justify either preference to public schools or impositions on private
religious schools. Here again it seems that the essence of the problem lies in Israel’s
definition as a Jewish state—the UO can say “our education is certainly compatible with
promoting the Jewishness of Israel and there is no agreement on its liberal democratic nature.”
For too long the state assumed that it is enough that the UO promote the Jewish component of
the state.
69 Id. at 61.
70 Id. at 60 (citing Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY 117 (W.G. Runciman & Peter Laslett eds., 3d series, 1969) (1967)).
71 Id.
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our religious beliefs. This effort of identification does not necessarily lead to
affirmation of the others’ point of view, and it can lead to mutual criticism,
as well as to self-criticism.72 Common schools have a unique contribution to
civic education because they can serve as a forum for inclusive deliberation
in which children are exposed to those who are different than themselves and
engage with them. In common schools children can participate in open
discussions in which diverse opinions are voiced, debated, and evaluated,
and through which they can evaluate the norms by which their communities
live.73 According to Callan, while religious schools can encourage other
aspects of civic education, they cannot serve as arenas for inclusive
deliberation, which is a vital component of civic education.74 Consequently,
he believes that in order to strike the proper balance between the important
state interest in promoting civic education and the right of religious
communities to religious education funded by the state, the state should fund
private religious education for younger children (while carefully regulating
it), but should refrain from funding religious schools in the later years of
education in order to encourage more parents to send their children to
common public schools.75
Although, like the two preceding theorists, Jeff Spinner-Halev believes
that autonomy is centrally important for liberal theory and society, he
nevertheless believes that as long as the secular mainstream society supports
autonomy and gives people a range of options to choose from, not every
religious minority group has to support autonomy as well. In his opinion,
minority communities need not inculcate autonomy, because as long as their
members are not being coerced and are not denied a decent education, their
ability to see the different ways of life surrounding them suffices to make
them able to choose.76 Thus, Spinner-Halev rejects arguments for cultural
pluralism that are based on autonomy as arguments that wrongly undermine
and restrict pluralism.77
Spinner-Halev defends the right of parents to send their children to a
private religious school in order to situate them in a community and enable
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Id. at 64.
74 Id. at 64 (citing J. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD
POLICY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 31 (A. Hamlin & P. Petit eds., 1989)).
75 Id. at 66.
76 JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, SURVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
50–51 (2000).
77 Id. at 55.
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minority communities to retain their identities.78 Furthermore, he argues that
it is important for children to be raised with specific values and have a strong
base in a particular way of life, in order to be able, later on, to make a
meaningful choice whether to change them.79 Thus, liberals should not
worry about children who are raised into relatively closed communities with
strong values, as long as at some point they are exposed to other ways of life.
More worrisome to him is the situation of children who are raised with no
worldview, because such children will not know how to choose one for
themselves.80
Nevertheless, in spite, or perhaps because, of his insistence that religious
communities within liberal societies do not have to foster their members’
autonomy, Spinner-Halev is critical of private religious schools and
emphasizes the importance of public schools. He argues that an important
problem with many religious schools is that they are not diverse and do not
expose their students to a diversity of ideas or of ways of life.81 The
exposure of students to diverse ideas and practices encourages them to think
creatively, critically and autonomously.82 Consequently, public schools are
important since they get children from different backgrounds together and
enable them to learn about one another and to learn how to work together.
Such experience prepares them better for citizenship in a complex, diverse,
modern world.83
Spinner-Halev further qualifies his defense of religious schools stating
that it applies only to schools that are not all encompassing, that belong to
moderate religious communities, and that do not stifle autonomy, but
combine it with community. According to him, “[a] community that tries to
prevent its children from having any contact with outsiders, even as they
become teenagers, is not combining autonomy and community. It is using
the community to stifle autonomy.”84 Furthermore, although he supports the
existence of moderate religious schools, he believes that religious schools
should not be funded by the state for two reasons. First, some of the religious
schools are not moderate and do not encourage liberal citizenship, and direct
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funding to such schools “would harm the important cause of creating and
sustaining a common citizenship.”85 Second, in order to encourage parents
to send their children to public schools, which are inclusive and promote
diversity, the state should refrain from financing private religious schools.86
However, he believes that, in order to encourage religious parents to send
their children to public schools, the schools should be willing to make some
accommodations and to grant some exemptions from the standard curriculum
for religious students upon their parents’ request.87 Thus, he believes that the
Mozert case in which the court denied the request of fundamentalist parents
to require a public school to exempt their children from various parts of the
curriculum, including from texts which teach that girls are equal to boys or
that teach evolution, was wrongly decided.88 In his opinion, the goal of
exposing as many children as possible to the most liberal education possible
is better achieved by giving partial exemptions to religious children that
enable them to continue in the public school system than by denying such
exemptions, thereby causing their parents to move them to a religious
fundamentalist school or to homeschool them.89
Unlike Barry and Callan, William Galston is situated firmly within the
camp of diversity liberals, who reject autonomy as the liberal point of
departure and instead offer “an account of liberalism that gives diversity its
due.”90 Galston argues that taking diversity seriously in the educational
context means that while any educational policy should balance between the
rights and interests of parents, children and the state, the rebuttable
presumption should be that the choices of parents with regard to the rearing
of their children are immune from state interference.91 He posits that
because parenting is one of the central meaning-giving tasks of our lives, and
because every parent hopes to create relations of intimacy with his children,
the ability of parents to raise their children in a manner consistent with their
deepest commitments is an essential element of their liberty that should be
respected by the state.92 Educational diversity is important, not only out of
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87 Id. at 94.
88 Id. at 91; see Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (1987).
89 Spinner-Halev, supra note 81, at 93–94.
90 Galston, supra note 7, at 523–24.
91 William Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority over Education in a
Pluralist Liberal Democracy, 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 284, 288 (2011).
92 Id. at 295.
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respect to the rights of parents, but also because it is essential for the
development of children’s individuality.93
Nevertheless, while parents and communities have the right to educate
children according to their beliefs and ways of life, and even to isolate them
to some extent from outside influences, Galston maintains that there are
important limits to this right. First, the education that parents provide for
their children must ensure that children have more than a merely formal right
of exit. Thus, communities and parents cannot educate children “in ways
that disempower individuals—intellectually, emotionally, or practically—
from living successfully outside their bounds.”94 States are allowed to insist
that education develop what Galston calls “social rationality,” which is the
kind of understanding needed to participate in the society, economy, and
polity, and they are allowed to intervene against forms of education “that are
systematically disenabling when judged against the norm.”95 Furthermore,
according to Galston, in societies characterized by deep diversity of moral
and religious views, educational freedom should be respected only “to the
maximum extent consistent with the maintenance of civic unity and
stability.”96 The state has the right to ensure that all children are taught that
other citizens have the right to live according to understandings of the good
life, which they themselves reject, and internalize norms of self-restraint and
a principled refusal to use coercion in order to enforce their own way of
life.97 Thus, according to Galston “the liberal state has a legitimate and
compelling interest in ensuring that the convictions, competencies, and
virtues required for liberal citizenship are widely shared.”98
At the extreme end of the diversity camp Chandran Kukathas posits that
the good society should downplay the role of the state in the education of
subjects. He argues that since two core principles of liberalism are toleration
of diversity and limited government, it cannot be part of the purpose of the
liberal state to educate its citizens or to shape their thinking.99 The state
should allow communities to educate their children according to their own
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beliefs, although it need not subsidize such education.100 Furthermore, the
state should even allow communities such as the gypsies, that do not value
schooling and that believe that they can educate their children satisfactorily
through informal instruction in the ways of their culture, not to send their
children to school at all.101 Kukathas objects to any form of civic education:
[T]he liberal state is one that is held to a very exacting
standard. It must tolerate in its midst those who would work
towards its destruction. And it must resist the temptation to turn
its fiercest critics into compliant believers in the liberal creed.
The last thing a liberal state should offer its subjects is
education—even if that should be a liberal education.102
He criticizes the position that a liberal polity must educate citizens to
participate in a shared political framework and to affirm shared political
principles, such as the obligation to respect the rights of fellow citizens
regardless of their religious convictions.103 To the contrary, he argues, “what
characterizes a liberal political order is not shared political commitments but
institutions which enable people whose moral, religious, cultural and
political commitments differ.”104 According to Kukathas, it is hard to see
how the same political order that allows people to hold illiberal and even
anti-liberal views, and allows them to proselytize those views and even run
for office on their basis, can justify inculcating particular liberal values or
virtues in its citizens. As he succinctly puts it “Liberalism does not run reeducation camps.”105 Kukathas rejects the conviction that liberal citizens do
not come into existence naturally but have to be made. He believes that
liberal citizens do, in fact, emerge ‘naturally’ in all liberal societies—and
“even in societies in which liberal freedoms are only weakly honored . . .”—
100 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND
FREEDOM 162 (2003).
101 Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights, 20 POLITICAL THEORY 105, 126
(1992).
102 Kukathas, supra note 99, at 323.
103 Id. at 326–27.
104 Id. at 328. This is of course facetious because the question is how to guarantee that these
institutions go on existing if people are not committed to their pluralist and egalitarian nature.
In his conclusion, Kukathas suggests that perhaps liberalism should not be as sanguine as he
seems to suggest that it should be, but for some reason this does not change his conclusions.
Id. at 330.
105 Id. at 328.
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and that liberal societies can survive even when many of their citizens are not
committed to liberalism and do not take any interest in politics
whatsoever.106 Kukathas is very clear in his emphasis on toleration and in
his critique of the limits placed on communities. Nevertheless, while failing
to qualify the sweeping toleration he advocates, he is careful to note that
such qualifications are due,107 and that his theory is probably not feasible for
any actual liberal state.108
To conclude, we see that among the theorists discussed, those who
support government funding for private schools insist that it should be
accompanied by close regulation by the state, while those who object to
government regulation of private religious schools also object to government
funding for such schools. Thus, despite their widely diverging views it
seems that none of the theorists discussed would support the current
treatment of UO education in Israel, which is given extensive funding by the
state but has complete freedom to decide the content of its curriculum.
Furthermore, with the exception of Kukathas, all the theorists discussed
believe that children have the right either to receive education for autonomy
or at least to receive an education that will enable them to exit their
community later on in life if they choose to do so. It seems that the
education that boys in the UO community receive, which is focused entirely
on religious studies and eschews any civic education, is precisely the type of
education that prevents them from having any meaningful right of exit.
B. Comparative Perspectives
In what follows I will discuss private religious education in five countries,
three of which are liberal democracies—the Netherlands, the U.K. and the
U.S.—and two non-liberal democracies—Malaysia and Turkey, one of
which is avowedly religious while the other avowedly secular. I chose to
examine these particular countries because, in addition to their varied
constitutional structures and ideological commitments, in all of them the
question of private religious education (especially Muslim education) has
been a cause for public debate and concern. The discussion will show that
the two models of state treatment of private religious education that exist in
106
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liberal countries are either state funding accompanied by close regulation
(the Netherlands and the U.K.) or no state funding with limited regulation
(the U.S.). Despite their markedly different treatment of religion, both nonliberal countries exhibit a similar model of close regulation with almost no
government funding. The comparison that follows between these five
countries and Israel highlights both how unique the Israeli model of
extensive funding for UO education with almost no regulation is, and how
the problem is exacerbated by Israel’s unique state-religion relations.
1. The Netherlands
The educational system in the Netherlands is characterized by a dual
system of education that allows for the existence of a large number of private
schools that are fully funded by the state alongside a system of public
schools. This unique system is a result of the process of pillarization which
occurred in the Netherlands at the beginning of the twentieth century and
which led to the segregation of Dutch society into pillars along religious and
ideological lines, each pillar containing its own political parties, labor
unions, hospitals, media, clubs, schools, etc.109 while a process of depillarization has occurred in the Netherlands since the 1960s, the educational
system has remained divided along denominational lines. Thus, in 2005 only
33% of the primary schools in the Netherlands were public, 30% were
Protestant, 30% were Roman Catholic, and the rest belonged to other
denominations and ideologies such as Islamic schools and Montessori
schools.110 The freedom of education is guaranteed in article 23 of the Dutch
constitution. According to the article, “[a]ll persons shall be free to provide
education,” but this right is subject to the right of the authorities to supervise
the schools, “to examine the competence and the moral integrity of the
teachers,” and to set the standards required of schools through acts of
parliament.111 The supervision of private schools must be done “with due
regard . . . to the freedom to provide education according to religious or other
belief.”112 “Private primary schools that satisfy the conditions laid down by

109 Geert Driessen & Michael S. Merry, Islamic Schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or
Marginalization?, 37 INTERCHANGE 201, 203 (Nov. 2006).
110 Id.
111 GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [GW] [Constitution] Feb. 17 1983,
art. 23, §§ 2, 5 (Neth.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/nl00000_.html.
112 Id. art. 23, § 5.
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acts of parliament” are entitled to public funds equal to those received by
public schools.113
The constitutional right to freedom of education had enabled the
Muslim community in the Netherlands to establish Islamic schools, and as
of 2006 there were forty-six Islamic primary schools and two Islamic
secondary schools in the Netherlands. Rather strict conditions have to be
met in order to establish a fully funded private school and the existing
schools do not meet the demand for Islamic schools within the Muslim
community and are attended by only about 10% of Muslim primary school
children.114 Strict requirements have to be met not only in order to
establish a funded school but also in order to ensure its continued
funding.115 Thus, although private schools have rather extensive autonomy
in determining what is taught and how, this autonomy is restricted by
qualitative and quantitative standards that private schools have to meet,
including teacher qualifications, curriculum requirements, and, in
secondary schools, “the examination syllabus and the national
examinations.”116 The requirement that schools must employ only teachers
that hold certain degrees and qualifications has proven to be quite
significant in the context of Islamic schools and has resulted in teachers in
these schools being mostly non-Muslims.117 While religious schools may
deviate from government attainment targets and substitute them with their
own targets if they can show that this is necessary from their religion’s
perspective, the substitute targets must be equivalent in quality. This
means, for example, that a school will probably not be allowed to replace
the teaching of the theory of evolution with the teaching of creationism
because the latter will not be regarded the equivalent of the former.118
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Since the late 1980s, the existence of private Islamic schools has
generated public discussions in the Netherlands concerning the desirability of
such schools.119 While opponents feared that such schools would hinder the
integration of Muslim immigrants into Dutch society by considerably
diminishing the contact of Muslim children with native Dutch children, their
proponents argued that these schools would promote the social integration of
Muslims while allowing them to maintain their own identity.120 After the
attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States, the influence of
political Islam on Islamic schools and its consequences for the integration of
Muslim children into Dutch society became a central theme of the public
debate surrounding these schools.121 Inspections in Islamic schools done by
the Ministry of Education concluded that the quality of the religion classes
and the religion teachers left much to be desired in many of the schools.
This was not surprising since, at the time, teachers of religious classes were
the only teachers who did not have to comply with any legal conditions
(diplomas or other qualifications), and the classes lacked curriculum and
method.122 Consequently, in the beginning of the 2007 academic year, all
Dutch Islamic primary schools were provided with an official Islamic
teaching curriculum, which was developed by the Foundation for Teaching
Methods (SLO) and the Board of Islamic Schools Organization (ISBO)—an
umbrella organization of forty-two Muslim schools in the Netherlands.123 At
the same time, new legal requirements that require Islamic Studies teachers
to have teacher diplomas were put into effect.124
The Dutch “rejection of the state as a moral educator” has led to the
absence of a separate subject of citizenship education from the national
curriculum for many years.125 However, after concerns were raised as to the
ability of Islamic schools to further integration and to inculcate pluralist and
democratic values, the Primary Education Act and the Secondary Education
Act were amended to require schools to offer education that is aimed at
119
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developing active citizenship and social integration. As with other curricular
subjects, schools are free to shape their own citizenship education
curriculum, but must present it to the Ministry of Education, which is
charged with monitoring and evaluating it.126
To conclude, the state in the Netherlands gives extensive funding to
private religious schools but, at the same time, closely monitors them in
order to ensure that they meet the state’s qualitative standards. The concern
for social integration and adherence to democratic values, brought about by
the relative expansion of Muslim schools, has led the state to introduce
citizenship education as a mandatory subject in all schools.
2. Britain
In England there are approximately 6,900 maintained faith schools that
make up one-third of all state-maintained schools.127 The overwhelming
majority of these schools belong to Christian denominations, such as the
Church of England and the Catholic Church. Only around fifty maintained
faith schools are non-Christian, thirty-seven of which are Jewish.128 Most of
the maintained faith schools are Voluntary Aided, while others are Voluntary
Controlled.129 Voluntary Aided schools are funded up to 90% by the state
and local authorities while the rest of their budget comes from the religious
bodies with which they are affiliated.130 The governing bodies of maintained
faith schools have control over school admissions and the teaching of
religious education.131 Nevertheless, all state-maintained schools must fully
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incorporate the national curriculum.132 In recent years there has been an
extensive public debate in England regarding the role of faith schools in
society and the continued, and even increasing, government funding of such
schools. Faith schools have been accused of undermining social cohesion
and heightening segregation along class, faith, and ethnic lines; using unfair
admissions policies that favor socio-economically privileged families; and
religious indoctrination.133 Supporters of faith schools have argued that faith
schools further the common good, give children a sense of their own identity
and promote choice, diversity, moral values and discipline.134 While the
events of 9/11 played a role in the debate, Muslim state-maintained schools
were not the focus of the debate, since they are only a miniscule part of the
faith maintained schools in England.135
There are about half a million Muslim children in British schools, and
they comprise between 5% and 6% of the total school population.136 The
vast majority of Muslim children attend public community schools or Church
schools, and “only [around 1%] of the Muslim children are educated in
independent or state-maintained Muslim schools.”137 Britain has 127
independent Islamic schools, the most in any European country.138 Since
Muslim independent schools do not receive any state funding, they are
usually small and suffer from severe financial limitations.139 A number of
Islamic independent schools have applied in recent years for state funding,
but since the process is extensive and often depends on political power
relations, only eleven schools have managed to gain a Voluntary Aided
status.140 The structural, legal, and political obstacles to the inclusion of a
large number of Muslim schools in the state sector have been exacerbated by
the public debate over state support for faith schools.141
While Voluntary Aided schools must fully incorporate the national
curriculum, independent Muslim schools can determine their own curriculum
but have to meet academic standards that are checked through periodic
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inspections and compulsory national tests.142 The Independent School
Standards regulations require independent schools to provide their students
with an education that, among other things, “gives pupils experience in
linguistic, mathematical, scientific, technological, human and social, physical
and aesthetic and creative education” and that ensures “adequate preparation
of pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult
life.”143 In addition, the independent school must educate its students to
respect the law and to contribute to the community, and it must “provide
pupils with a broad general knowledge of public institutions and services in
England; [and] assist pupils to acquire an appreciation of and respect for
their own and other cultures in a way that promotes tolerance and harmony
between different cultural traditions.”144
All independent schools, including independent faith schools, go through
periodic inspections and may face closure if they fail to meet the required
standards.145 In a case involving a Jewish Hasidic private school that was
threatened with closure for not teaching any secular subjects, it was held that
in general, in order to be considered “suitable,” education must “prepare the
children for life in modern civilised society” and “enable them to achieve
their full potential.”146 Nevertheless, education by independent faith schools
of religious communities will be considered ‘suitable’
if it primarily equips a child for life within the community of
which he is a member, rather than the way of life in the country
as a whole, as long as it does not foreclose the child’s options
in later years to adopt some other form of life if he wishes to do
so.147
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The Education (Independent School Standards) Regulations, 2010, S.I. 2010/1997, sched.
1, pt. 1 (Eng.).
144 Id. at pt. 2.
145 JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 423 n.124 (3d ed. 2009)
(reporting that forty-five independent schools were closed between 2004 and 2007, including
one Muslim school).
146 Harrison & Harrison v. Stevenson [1981] (unreported), Worcester Crown Ct., available
at http://freedom.edyourself.org/edact.htm.
147 Id.; R v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Sci. [1985] (unreported).
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Consequently, the school was obliged to implement a secular curriculum,
which it was required to further amend following continual inspection, until
its secular curriculum was found to be satisfactory.148
In order to meet the standards set by the regulations, as well as for lack of
financial resources, many of the independent Muslim schools follow the
national curriculum and use existing textbooks, although the more
conservative schools leave out aspects of the curriculum that are regarded by
them as ‘un-Islamic,’ such as music, dance and figurative arts.149 The
independent Muslim schools vary in their educational approaches and in
their level of religious observance, but all of them offer Islamic education
through special Islamic instruction, communal prayers, special dress codes,
and observance of the Islamic calendar.150 Unlike in the Netherlands, in
Britain most of the staff in Islamic schools are themselves Muslim, and thus
it is easier for them to create and maintain an exclusive Muslim
environment.151 Following the 9/11 attacks and the increasing concerns that
Islamic schools might isolate Muslim children from the larger society, a new
citizenship curriculum was introduced in British schools in 2002 and in
2007, and Voluntary Aided schools were required “to actively
promote . . . social cohesion.”152 This is done through participation in a
“citizenship and social cohesion” program, which is compulsory for all statefunded schools, and through other measures such as student exchange
programs between Muslim and non-Muslim schools and community
outreach programs.153 Some studies show that, while in the past educators
and parents have emphasized the role of Islamic schools in the process of
islamization of their students, the current focus of many Islamic schools is on
providing good academic results in a supportive environment that will enable

148 The Office for Standards in Education inspected the school in 2007 and found that while
its religious curriculum was good, its secular curriculum was unsatisfactory in several respects
and had to be expanded and improved. (OFSTED, TTMH BELZ DAY SCHOOL: INSPECTION
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/inspection-reports/find-inspection-rep
ort/provider/ELS/100294). A subsequent inspection in 2010 found that a new secular
curriculum had been introduced and that the secular curriculum was now satisfactory
(OFSTED, TALMUD TORAH MACHZIKEI HADASS AT THE WODLANDS: INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
STANDARD INSPECTION REPORT (2010), available at http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/inspection-repo
rts/find-inspection-report/provider/ELS/100294).
149 Niehaus, supra note 136, at 117–18.
150 Id. at 116.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 121.
153 Id. at 122.
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the students to prepare for their roles in the job market and as active
citizens.154
To conclude, while in Britain as in the Netherlands, the state is willing to
give extensive funding to faith-based schools (although in practice mostly
Christian schools enjoy this funding), it also monitors these schools closely,
including requiring them to teach the full national curriculum and a
“citizenship and social cohesion program.” Independent faith schools are
relatively few in number, and although they are not required to teach the
national curriculum, they are inspected to ensure that they give children an
adequate education that includes secular studies and teaches tolerance and
harmony between different cultural groups.
3. The United States
In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an Oregon law that made it mandatory for parents to send their
children to public schools, holding that:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.155
Nevertheless, while parents have a fundamental liberty to give their children
private religious education, the constitutional “wall of separation” between
church and state was held to prohibit any direct government funding for
private religious education.156 Even though the state cannot fund private
religious schools, it retains, under Pierce, the power
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
154
155
156

Id. at 125.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical
to the public welfare.157
The Supreme Court has never specified what kind of state regulation of
private schools constitutes “reasonable” regulation, but, in general, the
regulation in the United States is less intrusive and less comprehensive than
the regulation in Europe.158 An important reason for the lax regulation of
private religious schools is the fear that tighter regulation will create an overentanglement of government with religion and violate the free exercise rights
of religious communities.159 Nevertheless, most states impose various
curricular requirements on private schools, regardless of their religious
character or of the fact that they are not funded by the state.160 In the school
year 2009–2010 there were almost 5.5 million students in private schools,
80% of whom attended religiously affiliated schools.161 Students in private
schools constitute around 10% of the students in the United States.162
The strict prohibition on state funding for religious private schools has
been narrowed in recent years. In an important 2002 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a voucher program which gives parents tuition aid
through vouchers which they can use towards tuition costs in any private
school of their choice, including private religious schools, does not violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.163
This decision has paved the way for indirect government funding of private
religious schools.164 The Ohio program approved by the Supreme Court
157

Pierce, 286 U.S. at 534.
Richard W. Garnett, Regulatory Strings and Religious Freedom: Requiring Private
Schools to Promote Public Values, in EDUCATING CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 116, at 324, 329; see also REICH, supra note
53, at 147.
159 John F. Witte, Regulation in Public and Private Schools in the United States, in
EDUCATING CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE,
supra note 116, at 355, 360.
160 Catherine J. Ross, Fundamentalist Challenges to Core Democratic Values: Exit and
Homeschooling, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 991, 992 (2010) (citing Eric A. DeGroff, State
Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363, 393).
For a court case rejecting a challenge to state supervision of private schools see Fellowship
Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987).
161 Facts and Studies, COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION, http://www.capenet.
org/facts.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
162 Id.
163 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
164 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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required participating private schools to meet statewide educational
standards, to agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic
background, and not to “advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred
of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion.”165 Despite the considerable entanglement of the state in religious
messages that this form of state supervision over religious private schools
that accept vouchers might require, the Court did not strike down these
requirements. However, while it seems that the U.S. Constitution does not
forbid such supervision of private religious voucher schools, it does not
require it either. Consequently, it is up to the individual states to decide what
sort of conditions to attach to their voucher programs, and this can
potentially open the way to indirect state funding of private religious schools
that do not meet educational standards and that teach discrimination and
hatred. While this should certainly be of concern, the small number of
children currently participating in voucher programs in the U.S. makes this
concern less pressing.166
In addition to private religious schools, home schooling is a second form
of private education, which is mostly religious and which has grown
considerably in recent years in the United States. It is estimated that around
1.5 million children (almost 3% of school-aged children) are being
homeschooled in the U.S.167 Almost 90% of the parents who homeschool
their children do so because of their religious beliefs.168 Most of them “have
religious objections to placing their children in a public, or even a private,
school environment.”169 Homeschooling is dominated by conservative
Christian parents, although other deeply religious parents are also
increasingly turning to homeschooling.170 Interestingly, the number of
homeschooled children is almost double the number of children in private,
conservative Christian schools,171 a fact which seems to indicate that
conservative Christian parents have a preference for homeschooling. Several
state and federal courts have rejected the claim that homeschoolers are
165
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167 Ross, supra note 160, at 996.
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constitutionally entitled to complete freedom from state supervision.172 For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a claim by
conservative Christian parents against Pennsylvania’s homeschooling
laws.173 Pennsylvania requires parents who are homeschooling their children
to provide instruction for a minimum number of days and hours in certain
subjects and to submit a portfolio of teaching logs and the children’s work
product for review. In addition, it requires homeschooled children to take
“nationally normed standardized achievement tests in reading/language arts
and mathematics” in grades three, five, and eight, or to take statewide tests
administered at these levels.174 The parents claimed that the state’s
supervision violates their right to freedom of religion since it is their
sincerely held religious belief that God has given them the exclusive
responsibility for educating their children.175 The court rejected the claim,
holding that “the particular right asserted in this case—the right to be free
from all reporting requirements and ‘discretionary’ state oversight of a
child’s home-school education—has never been recognized.”176
Nevertheless, in most states in the U.S. homeschooling is significantly less
regulated than private schools, and in some states such as Alaska, it is not
regulated at all.177 The considerable number of homeschooled children,
coupled with the fact that most of the parents choose to homeschool their
children in order to prevent their exposure to different world views and to
critical thinking, has raised concerns regarding these children’s lack of civic
education and especially their lack of “exposure to the constitutional norm of
tolerance.”178
To conclude, while the regulation of private schooling in the U.S. is lax
and that of homeschooling is minimal or non-existent, these forms of
schooling are not funded by the state, and where private schools are partially
funded through vouchers their regulation is tighter. The fact that private
schooling is not funded by the state can explain its relatively small size and
serve as a partial check on the expansion of forms of religious education that
might be inimical to the interests of children and of the liberal state.
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Id. at 247.
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4. Malaysia
Unlike the countries discussed so far, Malaysia is not a secular liberal
democracy but an Islamic federation. Article 3 of the Malaysian constitution
states that “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be
practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.”179 Around
40% of Malaysia’s population is non-Muslim.180 Religion and ethnicity are
closely intertwined in Malaysia, and while the country maintains a façade of
interracial harmony and religious pluralism, clear preference is given in the
constitution and in federal law to the Malay ethnic group, who are generally
Muslims.181 While Islam has always played an important role in Malaysian
politics and public sphere this role has increased in recent years as the
increasingly successful PAS opposition party has pushed a stricter form of
Islam to counter the ruling UNMO party’s more moderate form (Islam
Hadhari or civilizational Islam).182 As will be discussed below, this struggle
has also had implications for Islamic education in Malaysia.
The Malaysian constitution guarantees individual religious freedom and
the right of every religious group to manage its own religious affairs.183
However, the constitution includes special provisions for Islam, which both
give preference to Muslims but at the same time restrict their behavior. For
example, the constitution allows state and federal law to “restrict the
propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the
religion of Islam.”184 Consequently, it is forbidden to propagate non-Muslim
religious doctrines to Muslims, and those wishing to propagate Muslim
religious doctrines and beliefs to Muslims must obtain permission from state
179

Constitution of Malaysia Aug. 27, 1957, Part I, art. 3.
Farish A. Noor, From Pondok to Parliament: The Role Played by the Religious Schools
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religious departments.185 The control over the propagation of Muslim
religious doctrines granted to the government in the constitution has enabled
the government, among other things, to clamp down on dissident Muslim
organizations and shut down their schools.186
In terms of religious education, article 12 of the constitution states that:
“Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for
the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no
discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such
institutions or in the administration of any such law.”187 Nevertheless, the
article gives a clear preference to Islam over other religions with respect to
state funding, stating that “it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State to
establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic
institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of
Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.”188
Consequently, only Muslim religious schools can be funded by the state in
Malaysia.189
The close ties between Malay identity and Islam, and the government’s
resolve to affirm Malay hegemony, have led to the increasing importance of
Islamic education and to attempts to systematize it within the national
system.190 In 1961, Islamic education was incorporated into the curriculum
of national primary and secondary schools, and this has “led to a . . . decline
in enrollment in both state and private Islamic schools.”191 These changes
were consistent with the policy of gradual absorption of Islamic educational
institutions and practice into the broad national educational system, and with
the increasing emphasis on Islam as a prominent part of the national Malay
identity and culture.192 In 1973, a separate religious education division was
established that is in charge of Islamic educational policy and curriculum, the
recruitment of Islamic education staff, and the raising of standards in both
national Islamic schools and government assisted Islamic schools.193 One of
the goals of the Islamic Education Division is to take over state Islamic
185
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schools and private Islamic schools and turn them into national Islamic
schools with a uniform syllabus.194
The nature of Malaysia’s private Islamic education has aided this process.
Private Islamic schools in Malaysia are governed by independent boards, and
their funds come from relatively low student fees and private contributions.
However, due to financial difficulties many of these schools have turned to
the government for financial assistance and have become semi-independent
government-assisted Islamic schools.195 After 9/11, the pressure on private
Islamic schools to conform to national authorities increased, and funding has
been withdrawn from hundreds of schools.196 While some of these schools
have closed for lack of funding, others have forgone their independence and
become fully aided government Islamic schools.197 The private Islamic
schools whose funding has been cut have been accused of stoking Islamic
extremism and being tied to Islamic militants.198 In addition, the Malaysian
government claimed that the non-religious curriculum in these schools was
so deficient that it left the children graduating from them virtually
unemployable.199 Furthermore, in order to persuade people not to enroll their
children into these schools, the government claimed that while 90% of the
graduates of government schools qualified for admission to Malaysian
universities, less than 25% of the graduates of private Islamic schools were
similarly qualified.200 However, critics claim that the main motivation for
the funding cuts was political, as these schools were connected to the PAS
opposition party that threatens the continued rule of the UNMO party.201
The funding cut combined with the government’s campaign against the
quality of private Islamic schools and the parallel expansion of the Islamic
education curriculum in national schools have led to a sharp decline in
enrolment in private Islamic schools.202 By 2004 these schools had suffered
a decrease of more than 50% in their enrolment and their student body
represented only 0.7% of the total student population in Malaysia.203
194
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Following the Malaysian government’s Ninth Malaysian Plan for the years
2006–2010, all private Islamic schools in Malaysia were required to adopt
the official Islamic education curriculum, thereby creating a homogenous
Islamic education curriculum in all Malaysian schools.204
To conclude, Islam is given a prominent role in Malaysia, and the
Malaysian constitution gives preference, power, and money to Islam and to
Muslim religious authorities. Nevertheless, the Malaysian legal system
ensures that the state maintains complete control over the interpretation of
Islam and over religious authority. This state of affairs enables the
government to dictate the form and content of Islamic education and to retain
a high degree of control over private Islamic schools.
5. Turkey
When the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923 religion was
banished from the public sphere.205 Hundreds of religious Muslim schools
(medreses) that were seen as incompatible with modern academic
requirements were closed, and the state established compulsory schools that
followed a national curriculum devoid of any religious instruction.206
Although secularization was central to the Kemalist modernization project,
and various Muslim practices such as the pilgrimage to Makkah (hajj) were
banned by law until 1947, Islam continued to play an important role in the
Kemalist understanding of the Turkish nation due to Islam’s importance as
the “unspoken bond” that created the Turkish nation from a multitude of
separate ethnic groups (including Anatolians, Kurds, Caucasians, Albanians,
Bosnians Tartars, etc.).207 The introduction of democracy in 1946, along
with the realization that the official ban on any form of religious education
was leading many to seek it via channels over which the state has no control,
led to the gradual reintroduction of religion into the public sphere and into
204
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the state system of education.208 Consequently, the notion of laicism, which
initially meant a complete ban on Islam, was transformed to mean the control
of religious expression by the state, and the following years saw a gradual
increase in state-controlled Islamic education.209 In the 1980s, the role of
Islam in Turkish society strengthened further. Islam was portrayed as a
national trait of the Turks and as a source of social and moral stability, and
obligatory religious courses were introduced in state schools.210
Although Turkey is defined in its 1982 constitution as a secular state,211
state control over Islamic education and its compulsory introduction into
state schools are enshrined in the constitution. Article 24 of the constitution
stipulates that: “Religious and moral education and instruction shall be
conducted under state supervision and control,” and determines that
“instruction in religious culture and morals shall be . . . compulsory . . . in the
curricula of primary and secondary schools.”212 The content of education
and the control of the state over it are further guaranteed by article 42 of the
constitution, which states that: “Education shall be conducted along the lines
of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, on the basis on contemporary
scientific and educational principles, under the supervision and control of the
State. Educational institutions contravening these provisions shall not be
established.” The article further stipulates that: “The freedom of training and
education does not relieve the individual from loyalty to the Constitution,”
and ensures the conformity of private education by requiring that “the
principles governing the functioning of private primary and secondary
schools shall be regulated by law in keeping with the standards set for the
state schools.”213
The secular state, through its Directorate for Religious Affairs, which
controls 70,000 mosques and thousands of Qur’anic courses and supervises
private forms of religious activities, is the most important religious player in
Turkey.214 The compulsory religious instruction given in all state schools
follows a relatively progressive form of Islam advanced by the state, which
has been called “Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis,” and which is aimed at

208 Id. at 152; see also Diren Çakmak, Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: The ImamHatıp Schools, 45 MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 825, 829 (2009).
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undermining Islamic influences outside of state control and assisting in the
project of national homogenization.215 The deep involvement of the Turkish
secular state with religion has made it necessary for the state to have schools
that can train students to perform religious functions in the community. This
has led the Turkish Ministry of Education to establish vocational schools for
Imams (prayer-leaders) and Hatips (preachers)—the Imam Hatip Schools—
whose operation began in 1951.216 Imam Hatip schools teach the full
curriculum that is taught in general high schools, while adding to it a
considerable number of religious vocational courses, and initially they
included both junior high school (6–8) and high school (9–12) grades.217
While the state retains full control over Imam-Hatip schools, and provides
the teachers, and pays for their salaries, all other school expenses are covered
by private donations.218 The private donations given to these schools on the
basis of their religious appeal are used to provide a better learning
environment for the students, such as a better teacher-student ratio than in
other public schools.219 The Imam-Hatip schools became very popular
among the more pious Muslim parents, who seized the opportunity to send
their children to a school that gave them both secular and religious education,
and by the mid-1990s about 10% of all students in Turkey went to ImamHatip schools.220 One reason for these schools’ popularity was that while
they enabled their graduates to go on to become Imams and Hatips, they also
enabled them to go on to study any university subject they desired, and
graduates would usually achieve high scores on the central university entry
exam.221
The growing popularity of the Imam-Hatip schools has generated an
extensive public debate regarding their desirability, with opponents arguing
that these schools are a threat to Turkey’s laicism and a hotbed for political
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Islam.222 These concerns have led, from 1997 onward, to the enactment of
reforms that significantly restricted Imam-Hatip schools and their graduates.
The first reform required all students to attend general, non-vocational,
schools for the first eight years of their education, thereby canceling the
junior high section of the Imam-Hatip schools.223 The second, even more
significant reform, implemented in 1999, changed the admission criteria for
universities, making it almost impossible for Imam-Hatip graduates to enter
any department except for theology faculties.224 In addition, Imam-Hatip
graduates were denied access to police schools and other sensitive
positions.225 These measures resulted in a sharp drop in student enrolment
and the closure of many Imam-Hatip schools.226 However, these reforms
were recently overturned by the Turkish government led by the Justice and
Development party (AKP).227
To conclude, although the Turkish state is defined as a secular state, it
employs a significant state apparatus to disseminate a state generated form of
Islam, and retains tight control over Islamic education.
C. Lessons from Theory and from Comparative Law and Practice
The review conducted above of theoretical literature on religious
education and of the comparative law and practice of liberal and non-liberal
countries reveals that while there are significant differences between the
different theorists reviewed and between the different countries reviewed,
some general conclusions that are pertinent to religious education in general
and to the UO education in Israel in particular can be drawn.
First, while in all surveyed countries there is, at least on the legal level,
state control over private religious education, in the U.S. this control is less
strict than in the other countries. This can be explained both by the strong
222
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constitutional separation between church and state, which prevents
government entanglement with religion, and by the strong ethos of negative
liberty and of small government, which reduces government involvement in
the private sphere to a minimum. Nevertheless, the same constitutional
principles that restrict the control over religious education in the U.S. also
work to prevent funding of religious schools. In the Netherlands and in the
U.K. where there is extensive funding for religious education there is also
quite extensive control over this education and while in both countries there
exists the option of running a private school with no state funding and with
considerably less supervision, this option is utilized by very few. In the nonliberal democracies (Malaysia and Turkey) close supervision exists
regardless of funding.
Thus, in the three liberal democracies examined there is a direct link
between the extent of funding and the extent of supervision. A similar close
relationship between funding and supervision can also be found among the
liberal theorists reviewed. This link is important, because it ensures that
government money that is used to support and expand the private religious
education system is not used towards purposes that are inimical to the liberal
democratic state. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the UO education
system in Israel, which receives extensive funding despite its refusal to teach
the core curriculum.
Second, although the three liberal democratic countries surveyed differ in
the amount of funding that they give religious education and have different
degrees and methods of control, neither of their systems is considered
incompatible with the right to religious freedom or with the right to culture.
This is important from the perspective of UO education in Israel, whose
supporters claim that despite the heavy funding that it receives from the state,
any supervision of it and any enforcement of standards would be a violation
of the parents’ religious freedom and of the community’s right to culture.
Third, In the four countries in which Muslim education was surveyed—
England, Netherlands, Malaysia and Turkey—a major concern for parents in
their choice of school is the need to give their children good secular
education, in addition to religious education, in order to enable them to
integrate in society and find good jobs in a modern economy. Thus, the need
to acquire sufficient skills to find good jobs has an important integrative and
de-radicalizing role. This need leads schools to maintain a high level of
secular education and may even lead parents to withdraw their children from
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schools that do not do so.228 Furthermore, most theorists discussed agree that
a curriculum comprised exclusively of religious studies is inimical to the
rights of children. While Barry and Callan believe that children have the
right to receive an education that develops their autonomy, Spinner-Halev
and Galston settle for an education that guarantees the children’s right of exit
in the sense that it enables them later on in life to live outside the community
if they choose to do so. The same concern for ensuring children’s right of
exit was expressed by the Israeli court in the Core Curriculum cases and by
the British court.229 Nevertheless, the current situation in the UO education
in Israel, which has been reinforced and made legal by the Unique Cultural
Educational Institutions Act, is that UO schools for boys teach exclusively
religious studies, and that consequently, young UO adults have almost no
option of exiting their community.230
Fourth, most of the theorists discussed, except Kukathas, also emphasize
the right and the duty of the liberal state to encourage and even ensure that
children receive some form of civic education that educates them to tolerance
and to life in a pluralistic diverse democratic society. Similarly, in both
England and the Netherlands such civic education is mandatory. In the UO
education system in Israel no such education is provided, despite the fact that
one out of every four students in the Jewish education system studies in an
UO school and that data shows that the UO community is the most intolerant
towards diversity, markedly more so than other groups in Israel.231
To summarize, the treatment of UO education in Israel is not required by
the right to religious freedom of UO parents and community. It also violates
the right of UO children to education and to equal opportunity and
jeopardizes the sustainability and the democratic structure of the state due to
228

See discussions of Turkey, Britain, and Malaysia, supra Parts III.B.2, 4–5.
For the British court, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
230 FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 188.
231 The 2010 Israeli Democracy Index recently published by the Israeli Institute for
Democracy found that the greater the level of religious observance, the stronger the objection
to equality of rights between Jews and Arabs. Thus, one of the issues that the survey
examined was to what extent the notion that citizenship is a legal status conferring equal rights
has been internalized by the Israeli public. According to the findings in the survey, while 51%
of the general public support full equality of rights between Jews and Arabs, a breakdown of
the Jewish public by religiosity shows that only 33.5% of secular Jews are opposed to such
equal rights, in contrast to 51% of traditional Jews, 65% of religious Jews, and 72% of ultraOrthodox Jews who are opposed to equal rights. These findings correspond to similar
findings in earlier surveys. Asher Arian et al., The Israel Democracy Institute 2010, Auditing
Israeli Democracy—2010 Democratic Values in Practice, 8, available at http://www.idi.org.
il/PublicationsCatalog/Documents/Book_7114/madad_2010_eng_abstract.pdf.
229
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the inordinately high number of children who are not exposed to any form of
secular and civic education. I could finish here, but my claim against the
right to an exclusively religious education granted to the UO through the
Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act runs deeper than that. I claim
that the state religion structure in Israel and the unique position of the UO
community within this structure and in the Israeli polity significantly
exacerbate the problem and that the comparative perspective can help us to
understand this.
Thus, the Fifth conclusion that can be drawn from the comparative
analysis concerns countries in which religion plays an essential role in their
national identity. While the two non-liberal countries surveyed—Turkey and
Malaysia—differ from each other markedly in their state religion relations, in
both countries Islam is heavily entangled with the state and is used by the
state as a unifying factor. In this respect both countries resemble Israel, in
which, as will be further discussed below, the Jewish religion plays a crucial
role in its self-identity, and is heavily entangled with the state. There is one
crucial difference between the situation in Israel and that in Malaysia and in
Turkey, which is highly relevant for our purposes. Because Malaysia and
Turkey acknowledge and promote the importance of Islam in their national
life and its power over the population, they control Islam tightly, limiting
dissent and endorsing a unitary version of a state controlled religion. While
this state of affairs is illiberal and disrespectful of individual rights, it is
effective in preventing the power of religion from being turned against the
state. Conversely, Israel, while emphasizing the importance of the Jewish
religion to the national ethos and giving the Orthodox Jewish religion both
state power and state budgets, refrains from controlling it. This is because
controlling religion in the way that Malaysia and Turkey do would go against
another important component of Israel’s ethos—the liberal component.
Consequently, Israel emerges as a unique hybrid which attempts to reconcile
two irreconcilable ideals: on the one hand it gives considerable state power
and state funds to its preferred religion—Orthodox Judaism (and is therefore
an instance of what Hirschl calls a constitutional theocracy), but on the other
hand, and at the same time, it attempts to respect liberal ideals such as
religious freedom in all areas not directly under the control of religious law.
Tellingly, as will be discussed below, the failure of this theocratic-liberal
hybridity does not manifest itself through Israel’s relatively decent treatment
of its Muslim and Christian minorities, but through its unremitting, and
indeed exaggerated, respect to the religious freedom of adherents of its
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dominant religion—Orthodox Judaism—of which the UO Jewish minority is
an important component.
In the next part of the Article I will describe how the combination of state
power and state funds for Orthodox Judaism coupled with extensive freedom
for its adherents to pursue and to radicalize their religious beliefs has resulted
in the UO’s minority exponential growth and in its radicalization to an extent
that today poses a threat to the liberal democratic ideals on which Israel is
based and requires a change of policy towards the UO education system.
IV. UO EDUCATION IN ISRAEL—AN ANALYSIS
In order to explain the uniqueness of the Israeli situation and the depth of
the problem that the current status of the UO educational system poses for
Israel, it is important first to give a short overview of state-religion relations
in Israel.
A. State-religion Relations in Israel
Unlike most other liberal democratic states, whose definitions do not
include references to the ethnic or religious character of those states, Israel is
defined in its Basic Laws as a Jewish and Democratic state. This definition
is relatively new and was adopted as part of the first of two Basic Laws on
human rights—Basic Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation.232 However, the origins of this definition can be traced to the
Israeli declaration of Establishment, which states that Israel is to be a
“Jewish state,” but at the same time that it will “ensure complete equality of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or
sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education
and culture.”233 It is important to note that there is an ongoing and as of yet
unsettled debate with regard to the exact meaning of the definition of Israel
as a Jewish state. While some consider that the definition of Israel as a
Jewish state mandates an establishment of the Jewish religion in the state,
and the granting of legal authority and status to the Jewish religion, others
232 Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391, p. 60 (Isr.), available at
http://knesset.gov/il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,
5752-1992, SH No. 187, p. 60 (Isr.) (null), available at http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/
basic5_eng.htm.
233 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Iyar 5, 5708 – May 14, 1948,
Official Gazette No. 1 p. 1, available at http://Knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm.
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dispute this reading of the Basic Laws. They argue that the definition
“Jewish state” should be understood as a national definition designating the
character of Israel as the home of the Jewish people, where Jews realize their
right to self-determination, and not as an establishment of the Jewish religion
in the state.234 Regardless of this debate and long before the enactment of the
Basic Laws, the Jewish religion in its Orthodox version has been partially
established in the state through laws granting legal status to Orthodox Jewish
religious authorities in several areas, the most important of these being that
of personal laws. This partial establishment originates in the pre-state era
and in the need of the leaders of the Zionist movement to secure the support
of the religious factions within the Jewish community for the establishment
of the Jewish state, and it has come to be known as the “Status Quo.”235
Some argue that this partial establishment was also motivated by the need of
the new Zionist secular regime to gain legitimization by maintaining a
connection with the Jewish past.236 Be that as it may, the Israeli model of
state-religion relations, which, from the outset, has given substantial
preference to the Orthodox Jewish religion, deviates from the classical liberal
model that aspires to treat all religions equally and neutrally.
The most important aspect of the partial establishment of Orthodox
Judaism is that all Jews in Israel are subject to Orthodox Jewish religious
personal laws. At the same time, it is important to note that members of
other recognized religious communities, such as Muslims and various
Christian denominations, are also subject to the personal religious laws of
their particular religions.237 This state of affairs was first instituted during

234 See Avigdor Levontin, Jewish and Democratic: Some Personal Reflections, in THE
STATE OF ISRAEL: BETWEEN JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY 281 (Yossi David ed., 2003) (taking a
position against interpreting the term Jewish in the Basic Laws as including the Jewish
religion). But see Menachem Elon, Constitution by Legislation: The Values of a Jewish and
Democratic State in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Personal Freedom, 17 IUNEI
MISHPAT 659, 668–70 (1993) [Hebrew] (taking a position supporting the inclusion of the
Jewish religion in the term “Jewish”).
235 Daphne Barak-Ezez, Law and Religion Under the Status Quo Model: Between Past
Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495 (2009). For more on the
“Status Quo” see id. at 2507 n.2 and accompanying text.
236 Yonatan Shapira, Secular Politicians and the Status of Religion in the State of Israel, in
MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE, THE ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI MEMORIAL
BOOK 663, 669 (Menachem Mautner et al. eds., 1998).
237 The authority of the various religious communities was established through legislation
from the period of the British Mandate and was later incorporated into Israeli law. The
Palestine Order in Council Sign 51–52 (1922). The detailed authority of the Jewish

2014] THE UO COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 787
the period of Ottoman rule over the Eretz-Israel/ Palestine region, was
maintained by the British Mandate, and later by the State of Israel.
The imposition of the religious personal laws of the various
religious communities on all residents and the lack of an
alternative civil marriage, constitutes a violation of the right to
freedom of conscience and belief, as well as a violation of the
rights of women who are subject to the discriminatory
patriarchal religious laws of the various religious
communities.238
While establishing an exclusively religious system of laws in matters of
marriage and divorce is probably the most serious entanglement of religion
within the Israeli state, there are several other areas in which religion, and in
particular the Orthodox Jewish religion, is given a preferred status by the
state, either through statutes or through administrative decisions, which
confer to it state power as well as money. Thus, the state has established a
chief rabbinate and has given full control over it to Orthodox Judaism.239
The Chief Rabbinate is a powerful state organ that enjoys large budgets and
controls the religious services given by the state to the Jewish population.
Some of the state and municipal institutions established and financed by the
state and subject to the religious authority of the Chief Rabbinate are the
rabbinical courts that deal with matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in
Israel, the regional religious councils, which deal with the supply of religious
services—such as burial (public cemeteries in Israel are overwhelmingly
religious), synagogues, kashrut (Kosher certification of food), etc.—to Jews
on a regional basis, and the conversion courts, which deal with conversion to
Judaism.240

Rabbinical Courts is set out in The Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce),
Acts 5713-1953, 7LSI 139 (Isr.).
238 Gila Stopler, The Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel and the Right to an Exclusively
Religious Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 312,
322 (Susana Mancini & Michael Rosenfeld eds., 2014) (citing Frances Raday, On Equality, in
WOMEN’S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY 19 (F. Raday et al eds., 1995)).
239 Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH No. 965, p. 90 (Isr.).
240 Jewish Religious Services Law, 5731-1971, SH No. 628, p. 130 (Isr.).
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B. What Does All This Have to do with the UO?
Despite the UO community’s anti-Zionist ideology and its enclave
mentality, the UO community holds key positions in Israel’s religious
establishment. UO Rabbis have been serving as judges in the Rabbinical
Courts system, to which all Jews are subject in matters of marriage and
divorce, from its inception.241 In fact, UO Rabbis form the majority of
rabbinical court judges, and at time of writing all but one of the judges on the
Great Rabbinical Court, which is the highest rabbinical court and hears
appeals from all the regional rabbinical courts, are UO.242 Through their
positions, the UO judges are authorized to impose their version of ultraorthodox Jewish religious law on all Jews in Israel. In recent years, with the
increasing radicalization in the UO community, the rulings of rabbinical
courts have become more conservative and more detrimental to the rights of
women and to the rights of converts. To give just one example, a rabbinical
court has recently ruled that a wife who sued her husband for damages
because of his refusal to release her from their marriage for ten years is
herself to blame for his continuous refusal to divorce her, and that until she
consents to her husband’s financial demands she is not entitled to the
divorce.243
In addition, the influence of UO political parties, which began as early as
the establishment of the state, has strengthened considerably ever since.244
This influence has allowed UO politicians to obtain considerable budgets for
the UO community, which support their Yeshiva studies and their increasing
families.245 It has also allowed the UO community to have significant impact
on general issues affecting Israeli society at large, by serving in key positions
such as the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Housing, the deputy Minister
of Health, the Minister of Religious Services, the head of the Parliament
(Knesset) Finance Committee, and the Mayor of Jerusalem. In their
capacities in the government, in the Knesset and in the local municipalities,
241 Nissan Slomiansky, The Appointment of Rabbinical Court Judges – An Ultra-Orthodox
State or a Zionist State?, NE’EMANEI TORAH VA’AVODAH, http://www.toravoda.org.il/node/
584 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [Hebrew].
242 Uri Polack, For the First Time in a Decade: A Religious Zionist Judge on the Great
Rabbinical Court, KIPA.CO.IL (Mar. 25, 2012, 9:12 AM), http://www.kipa.co.il/now/47971.
html [Hebrew].
243 Rivka Luvitch, Rabbinical courts, raise the anchor!, YNET (Feb. 8, 2011, 2:07 PM),
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4025574,00.html [Hebrew].
244 See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 235.
245 Heilman & Friedman, supra note 10, at 189.
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UO politicians and public servants strive to force their ultra-Orthodox
religious ideology on the public at large, in contravention of the liberal
values of the state. To give one example, in Jerusalem UO politicians
controlling the municipal government have for years been denying municipal
budgets to the Homo-Lesbian community in Jerusalem despite repeated court
rulings holding that such denial is discriminatory and illegal.246 To give
another example, the deputy Minister of Health, who is a member of an UO
political party, has initiated segregation between men and women in official
events held by the Ministry of Health. In November 2011, the minister
instructed that two women, a doctor and a nurse, who received an award
from the Ministry of Health for their research, may not come up on stage to
receive their award at the official award ceremony. The women were
required to send a male representative to receive the award in their name,
while they had to observe the ceremony from the balcony of the segregated
auditorium to which all women were restricted.247 A final example is a
religious ruling issued in 2010 by fifty municipal Rabbis, both ultraOrthodox and religious Zionist, forbidding the sale and rental of homes to
gentiles, particularly to Arabs.248 All of these examples involve UO public
servants who receive their salary from the state and claim to be acting within
their authority.
The above account demonstrates how UO state officials, representing the
UO community, are engaged in strengthening the hold of ultra-Orthodox
religious ideology in the Israeli government and in the Israeli public sphere
and have significant impact on the lives of all Israelis. At the same time,
these officials contend that the UO educational system is entitled to full
autonomy as part of the freedom of religion and of the multicultural respect
owed to the UO community as a secluded religious minority which is
dedicated to its deeply religious (yet deeply illiberal) way of life. This
position was adopted by the Knesset in the Unique Cultural Educational
Institutions Act which exempts UO high school students from studying the
core curriculum. However, in light of the considerable state power that the
UO community wields through its representatives, the allegedly multicultural
accommodation legislated through the Unique Cultural Educational
246

See C.A. 343/09 Open House v. Jerusalem (Sept. 14, PD [2010] (Isr.) (unreported)).
Ethan Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Israelis Facing a Seismic Rift Over Role of Women,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/middleeast/israel-face
s-crisis-over-role-of-ultra-orthodox-in-society.html?pagewanted=all.
248 Kobi Nahshoni, 50 municipal rabbis: Don’t rent flats to Arabs, YNET (Dec. 7, 2010, 5:24
PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3995724,00.html.
247
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Institutions Act is theoretically unsound and poses a serious threat to the
liberal democratic infrastructure of the state. The idiosyncrasy of providing
this type of multicultural accommodation to the UO in Israel can be best
understood by comparing their situation to that of two American enclave
minorities—the Amish and the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel.
C. The UO Community in Israel—Partial Citizens or a Prodigious Enclave
Community?
When considering the appropriateness of multicultural accommodations
for illiberal minorities, Jeff Spinner-Halev introduces a useful distinction
between full citizens and partial citizens. He argues that, in general, all
citizens of the state must adhere to moral requirements of liberal citizenship,
including citizens belonging to illiberal minority communities. However, a
narrow exception to this rule can be made in the case of minority
communities whose behavior vis-à-vis the state entitles them to be
considered partial citizens and, consequently, be partially exempt from some
of the requirements of liberal citizenship.249 According to Spinner-Halev
many illiberal religious groups want to lead their lives away from the
mainstream community in order to maintain a distinct identity. Nevertheless,
partial citizens are only those isolationist groups whose separation from the
liberal state and society is almost complete. Members of such groups must
not involve themselves in politics, they must not “press the state for financial
favors of funds to establish institutions for themselves,” and they should not
“ask for things that will harm other citizens.”250 Spinner-Halev believes that
allowing partial citizenship under such conditions will not threaten liberal
citizenship because the conditions for becoming partial citizens are so
difficult that there is very little likelihood that many groups will choose this
path. Thus, partial citizenship rests on a bargain: “as long as the group stays
away from the common life of the country, and doesn’t try to eat at the
public trough, then society can agree that citizenship has fewer claims on
them than on others.”251
In terms of education, Spinner-Halev maintains that while partial citizens
cannot be exempt from the duty to teach their children basic skills, they can
be exempt from teaching them the critical thinking skills that future citizens

249
250
251

SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 76.
Id.
Id. at 71–72.
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in a liberal democracy need to acquire.252 A group that, according to
Spinner-Halev, is entitled to a status of partial citizenship is the Amish in the
United States. Consequently, he supports the Yoder decision, which
exempted the Amish in Wisconsin from the legal duty to send their children
to school for the last two years of the state’s compulsory education.253 In its
decision, the Court relied heavily on the nature of the Amish as a lawabiding, “separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community”
which is self-sustaining to such an extent that it rejects any form of public
welfare.254 The court further held that the Amish carried the burden of
demonstrating that the vocational education that they want to offer their
children in lieu of the compulsory state education is able to provide them
with basic skills such as “reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work,”
and that there are probably few other religious groups or sects who could
carry such a burden.255
Conversely, Spinner-Halev argues that isolationist groups that want to
retain their separation, but at the same time want the state to help them, do
pose a real threat to society. An example of such a group, which SpinnerHalev discusses, is the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel in New York. In
particular, he criticizes the establishment of a publicly-funded school
exclusively for Satmar children with disabilities.256 He argues that public
funds should only be used to support public schools that are open to all and
not public schools that provide separate education to children of insular
groups.257 Because the Satmars want to use public funds to educate their
children separately from other children they cannot be considered partial
252

Id. at 72. A similar suggestion is made by Galston with respect to the imposition of the
demands of education for shared citizenship on all groups. According to his suggestion,
groups that are willing to abide by the basic laws of the community without making full
claims upon it may be given some form of intermediate status and be exempted from some of
the requirements of full citizenship. Galston, supra note 7, at 529.
253 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a detailed criticism of the view that the
Amish are a secluded minority which does not utilize political power see BARRY, supra note
58, at 176–93.
254 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222, 225.
255 Id. at 224, 235–36.
256 The law establishing the special school district for the Satmar was struck down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994), but a subsequent law allowing for the reestablishment of the special school district
was affirmed by a state court. Tamar Lewin, Controversy Over, Enclave Joins School Board
Group, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/20/nyregion/controver
sy-over-enclave-joins-school-board-group.html.
257 SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 76, at 80–81.
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citizens. In addition, Spinner-Halev argues that the Satmars should not be
considered partial citizens because many of them use food stamps and live in
public housing, and because they vote. In fact, he observes that it is because
the Satmars vote, and because they usually vote en bloc, following the
directions of their rabbi, that politicians were willing to cater to their demand
for a separate school district.258
Will Kymlicka holds a similar position to Spinner-Halev’s. According to
him, as long as isolationist groups are small and sincerely committed to their
self-imposed isolation they pose no threat to liberal citizenship and to a
stable liberal order and can therefore be exempted from some obligations of
citizenship, such as sending their children into common public schools for
part of their education.259 Nevertheless, Kymlicka emphasizes that such
groups should not be encouraged, since they are free-riders on a stable liberal
order which they do not help maintain, but posits that as long as they remain
small the liberal state can afford to accept them.260
Despite the fact that the UO are portrayed by supporters of the Unique
Cultural Institutions Act as partial citizens similar to the Amish, who should
be entitled to exemptions from the obligations of citizenship, they are, in
fact, very different from the Amish. The UO are deeply involved in state and
municipal politics, and their community is heavily funded by the state. In
fact, perhaps ironically, the UO’s extensive involvement in politics and their
extensive funding by the state are what enabled UO leaders to create and
maintain the semi-enclave for which they are now claiming multicultural
protection. The generous state funding for religious education from early
childhood through late adulthood has enabled the transformation of the UO
community into a community of learners in which an unprecedented number
of adult men study religious studies and do not need to work for a living.
This enables these men to lead most of their lives without having to step out
of the UO community. In addition, state funding of UO men’s religious
studies has enabled the UO educational system to shun any secular studies,
since many of its graduates continue their religious studies into adulthood
and consequently do not have to find jobs. The shunning of any secular
education and the exclusive focus on religious studies made possible by

258

Id. at 79–80.
WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS
AND CITIZENSHIP 305–07 (2001).
260 Id.
259
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increasing state funding has led to the growing radicalization of the UO
community.261
Due to its size, the UO community cannot even be compared to the
Satmar Hasidim of New York, despite the fact that both communities subsist
mainly on public funds, which they obtain using their political power. The
UO are by no means a small minority whose freeriding can be easily
absorbed by the larger Israeli society. Almost one out of every three Jewish
students in the Israeli primary school system is educated in an UO school,
and the number is continuously increasing owing to the UO community’s
high fertility rates.262 This means that the number of school children who are
not taught basic skills and civic education and are given an exclusively
religious education is very high, creating serious concerns as to Israel’s
continued economic sustainability and democratic stability.
Furthermore, because of the unique religion-state relations in Israel the
power that the UO community holds over other citizens and its ability to
undermine the liberal democratic structure of the state are considerable. The
establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion in the state has enabled the
UO community, through its representatives in the religious establishment, to
become the official interpreters of the Jewish religion, determining the legal
status of other citizens’ marriages and divorces, of their conversions, and of
their children’s religious status on the basis of their own radical religious
ideology.263 In addition, the lack of separation between religion and the state
coupled with the UO’s extensive political power enables them to deepen the
hold of their radical interpretation of the Jewish religion over the Israeli
public sphere. Consequently, one could argue that far from being a
disempowered community, the UO is a prodigious enclave community that
uses its political and state power both to guarantee its own flourishing and
expansion, and to enforce its ideology on the rest of society. Thus, unlike the
Amish or even the Satmars, the UO do not isolate their members from
mainstream society merely as a means of maintaining their separate way of
life, but also as a means of fostering a radical religious ideology which they
can then impose on others.

261

FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 80–86.
Yarden Skop, Forecast: Only 40% of Israeli students will attend nonreligious schools by
2019, HA’ARETZ DAILY, Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/premium-1.540130.
263 It should be noted that another group which is influential group in the Israeli religious
establishment are the religious Orthodox Zionists, but the UO are the more powerful of the
two groups.
262
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This last point relates to a final important distinction between the UO and
other isolationist groups. Most isolationist groups do not challenge the
liberal democratic structure of the country within which they reside. Even
the Satmars in New York, who are UO Jews themselves, whose way of life is
quite similar to that of the UO in Israel, who use their voting power to their
advantage, and who avail themselves of government funds, have no intention
of challenging the liberal structure of the United States. They are, in fact,
supportive of it, since it guarantees their religious freedom and their rights as
a minority culture.264 Furthermore, the Satmars’ small size, as well as the
separation of church and state that exists in the United States, precludes their
ability to enforce their illiberal religious ideology on others. Conversely, the
UO community in Israel has, from early on, challenged the liberal
democratic structure of the state and has been given state power and political
influence that have enabled it to gradually erode this structure and implement
its own illiberal religious ideology. Under these circumstances it is wrong to
view the UO community as a disempowered minority that is entitled to a
multicultural accommodation of its illiberal practices.265
V. CONCLUSION
Almost one out of every three Jewish children in the Israeli primary
school system is educated in the UO educational system, which is heavily
funded by the state but does not teach boys almost any secular subjects. This
state of affairs poses a serious threat to the continued sustainability and
stability of Israeli democracy. Those who support the continuation of this
status quo claim that it is required by the right of UO parents and the UO
community to freedom of religion and to multicultural accommodation. The
survey of theorists and countries presented in Part III refutes this claim.
Furthermore, supporters of the continued exemption of UO education from
the core curriculum regard the UO community as an enclave community and
fail to take into consideration both its extensive political power and its hold
over Israel’s religious establishment, which, due to Israel’s state-religion
relations, yields considerable power over the lives of all Israelis. Thus, they
fail to take into account the violation of rights that women, Arabs,
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homosexuals, converts, and others suffer as a consequence of the application
of deeply illiberal Ultra-Orthodox religious ideology by OU politicians and
state officials—who are the products of an UO education system that shuns
any civic education.
The aforementioned suggests that it is imperative to introduce the core
curriculum into the UO educational system. However, since the UO
educational system is known for its lack of cooperation with the state and for
being almost impenetrable to outside supervision, direct enforcement of the
core curriculum may prove impracticable.266 It would seem that a more
suitable way to go about creating the necessary change in the UO educational
system is by cutting funding to any UO school that does not teach the core
curriculum, including citizenship education. Cutting funding is both less
intrusive than direct and universal enforcement, and, as the experience in the
countries discussed in this article shows, cutting funding is an efficient
means of ensuring that schools conform to state requirements. Supervision
over the teaching of the different subjects by schools that choose to receive
funding can be done by testing students’ knowledge in each subject, a
method which is both less intrusive and more accurate than direct
supervision of instruction.
However, in this Article I have tried to show that the characteristics of the
UO educational system cannot be understood or assessed without
understanding the structure of the UO community and its position in the
Israeli polity. It would have been impossible for the UO educational system
to shun all forms of secular education if the UO community were not able to
offer most of its young male adults the option of continuing their religious
studies for an unlimited time with government funding. Consequently, an
essential step in order to encourage the UO educational system for boys to
teach secular studies is to gradually cut the funding for most of the adult men
who study in UO religious institutions of higher education—Yeshivot Gdolot
and Kolelim—and retain funding only for a select few on the basis of
excellence. As the experience of other countries shows, the realization that
most of their graduates will have to find jobs in the modern world, coupled
with the need for state funding, would encourage UO schools to introduce
adequate secular studies that would be supervised by the state. It is
important to note that, despite the central importance of Talmud Tora as a
religious precept, it has in the past always been the case in UO communities,
both in Israel and abroad, that only those who excel in Yeshiva studies
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become professional learners, while all others go out to work and earn a
living that supports them as well as their communities.267 The transformation
of the UO community in Israel into a community in which most men are
learners and do not work for a living is a modern phenomenon facilitated by
the UO community’s political power, which has enabled it to obtain everincreasing budgets for its religious institutions.268
Finally, a third step that must be taken in order to facilitate the
introduction of secular studies in UO schools is to gradually require
candidates for public service positions in Israel’s religious establishment to
meet minimal requirements for secular studies, including citizenship
education. The fact that most, if not all, UO representatives in Israel’s
religious establishment lack secular education, and especially citizenship
education, including education for tolerance and equality, has serious
implications for the rights of all Israelis. It is hardly surprising that UO
public servants apply their radically illiberal religious ideology to the citizens
they are expected to serve, when this ideology is the only one they have ever
been exposed to. If UO public servants were exposed from an early age to
secular education and to citizenship education, they might be more open to
accepting the diversity which characterizes modern Israeli society and to
endorsing the state’s legal commitment to equality and pluralism, as their
position in the public service requires them to do. Although studying the
core curriculum may not be sufficient to instill in UO public servants, and
indeed in any public servant, the necessary commitment to equality and
pluralism that must characterize the public service in a liberal state, it is
certainly a prerequisite.
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